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Executive Summary 
In this essay, I address the problem of conflicts of interest in the context of funded 
research and opinions that are disseminated to the public by academics, think tanks, and 
individuals affiliated with think tanks. I argue that “full disclosure” may be a laudable 
goal, but is likely to be a disaster in practice. In addition, I argue that some disclosure 
norms imposed by the media are not likely to be very helpful in promoting useful 
information for their audiences, and will likely have unintended adverse consequences.   
 
There are no simple solutions to the problem of identifying conflicts of interest 
and potential biases associated with research and opinions reported in the media. I believe 
the problem could constructively be addressed by honing the thinking skills of the media 
































he enron “scandal” has raised several fascinating
issues related to disclosing information and potential con-
flicts of interest. For example, an accounting firm that
receives consulting fees from a company it is paid to audit
may be less likely to report financial problems with that
company. But contrary to conventional wisdom, simply not allowing that
firm to consult will not necessarily solve the problem. The accounting firm
will still have potential conflicts so long as it is getting paid by other firms
to monitor their performance. In the past, accounting firms have used
professional standards as a way of helping to ensure their reputation. In
addition, they have tried to have a diverse client base, so the costs of los-
ing one client would not be overwhelming. 
The False Promise of
“Full Disclosure”
By Robert W. Hahn
Robert W. Hahn, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute
and a research associate at Harvard University, is director of the AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. The views expressed in
this paper reflect those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the institutions with which he is affiliated.
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Similarly, academics and pundits receiving monetary compensation from
a company may be more likely to give that company’s policy positions a
favorable review. One solution to this problem is to have these folks come
clean by identifying their conflicts of interest. Unfortunately, as we shall see,
this is easier said than done and is likely to have unintended consequences.
Consider, for example, the problem of conflicts of interest in the context
of funded research and opinions that are disseminated to the public by jour-
nalists, academics, and individuals affiliated with think tanks. This is a
broad topic and one with which I have some personal experience as a schol-
ar and a consultant to business and government.1 My purpose is to evaluate
the pros and cons of disclosing potential “conflicts of interest.” “Full disclo-
sure” may be a laudable goal, but is difficult to define and, therefore, not
very useful. In addition, some disclosure norms imposed by the media are
not likely to be very helpful in promoting useful information for their audi-
ences, and will likely have unintended adverse consequences. The problem is
not that disclosure is necessarily bad, though it may lead to bad outcomes in
certain situations. Instead, the problem is that too often, the media and the
public use partial disclosure as a substitute for critical thinking.
The nature of the problem
P
aul Krugman — one of the best known economists in acade-
mia — received $50,000 for serving on an advisory board to
Enron. Krugman, of course, was not alone. For example, Larry
Lindsey, President Bush’s chief economic advisor, was reported to have
received the same amount. 
Defending himself in his New York Times column (January 25, 2002),
Krugman noted that he complied with the Times’ conflict of interest policy.
When he agreed to write for the paper, he resigned from the Enron board. In
addition, Krugman noted the potential conflict posed by his Enron advisory
role in a Fortune piece he published three years ago. 
Krugman’s level of disclosure, however, did not seem to satisfy Andrew
Sullivan — an excellent journalist. On his website, andrewsullivan.com
1I rely heavily on personal anecdotes in places to make my case, in part because I have
some inside information that is useful. In addition, I do not wish to make my colleagues
the targets of ad hominem attacks. I would like to thank Christopher C. DeMuth,
Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Thomas W. Hazlett, Scott Hemphill, Charles Jackson, Clark
Judge, Paul Krugman, Robert Litan, Peter Passell, Richard Posner, and Cass Sunstein for
helpful comments, and Mary Beth Muething for excellent research assistance. 
This work was supported by the aei-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies. A list of funders can be found on the Joint Center website: 
www.aei.brookings.org. The False Promise of “Full Disclosure”
(January 25, 2002), Sullivan took Krugman to task for not noting the
amount of money he received. Sullivan noted, “You’ll notice one detail
missing from Krugman’s apologia — the amount of money he got. Why
won’t he mention it? Because it’s the most damning evidence against
him.” He thinks “the reading public has a right to know” such information.
Sullivan raises an important question: What does the public have a right
to know about a person’s opinion or findings? That is, what should acade-
mics and pundits be required to say about their remarks or research when
presenting it in public?
Sullivan thinks that full disclosure is the key. He made the point specifi-
cally with respect to talking heads: “What this is
about is the enmeshment of some of the pundit
class in major corporate money. It seems to me
that an integral part of a journalist’s vocation is
independence — independence from any monetary
interests that could even be perceived as clouding
his or her judgment. Disclosure is a must — and
not just when the subject matter comes up a few
years down the line” (January 23, 2002). 
Unfortunately, Sullivan’s suggestion has serious
problems. There is no obvious place to draw the line
on what needs to be disclosed. In some cases in pub-
lic life, full disclosure has been interpreted to go
beyond an individual to an individual’s acquaintances or family. For exam-
ple, when the aol-Time Warner merger was approved by the fcc, the
impartiality of the current chairman of the fcc, Michael Powell, was ques-
tioned because his father was on the aol board of directors and owned
stock in the company. 
Take the Krugman example again. What constitutes all relevant informa-
tion for purposes of disclosure? Is it relevant, for example, to know that
Krugman received the Clark Medal — given every other year to the “best”
economist under 40 or that he has published numerous pathbreaking books
and journal articles? Krugman pointed out in his January 25 column, in his
own defense, that “the compensation [he] received per day [from Enron]
was actually somewhat less than other companies were paying [him] at the
time for speeches on world economic issues.” All of these things are
arguably relevant, but some in the public would really like to know how
much credence to put in Krugman’s view on a particular subject. More gen-
erally, the public and interested parties might like to have mechanisms intro-
duced that would lower the cost of obtaining and evaluating information on
a particular subject.
Firms, non-profits, and individuals have dealt with the problem of estab-
lishing credibility in a number of ways. For example, Consumer Reports,
which evaluates many kinds of consumer products, does not take money
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its website reads: “Our mission since 1936: Test, Inform, Protect. We
accept no ads.” The New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and many
other media outlets place restrictions on what journalists can do in order to
maintain their independence. 
The rules governing academicians and think tank types generally require
some form of disclosure. For example, the aei-Brookings Joint Center,
which I direct, requires that authors submitting analyses of specific regula-
tions do not receive any support from industry for the regulatory policy
under study. We do that in order to preserve our reputation for impartiality
in this area. With regard to other publications, we ask authors to note
sources of financial support. And research journals are increasingly interest-
ed in knowing about sources of funding for research
work.
Universities place restrictions on how professors
identify themselves when doing outside consulting
and testimony. Think tanks do as well. For example,
authors are typically required to differentiate con-
sulting products from university or think tank prod-
ucts by noting the source of support and not using
the institution’s logo without permission.
Many in the press ask for similar kinds of disclo-
sure. When I receive a call from the press about one
of my studies, one of the first questions asked is who
funded it. Indeed, that question often seems to be
more important to the journalist than how I arrived
at the results. That suggests a fundamental problem
to me. Many journalists either don’t have the time
to, or simply cannot, evaluate the validity of studies. Instead, they simply
take cues from less important aspects, such as the source of funding or the
affiliation of the individual. 
Judge Richard Posner, in Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline
(Harvard University Press, 2001) argues that there is little accountability for
public intellectuals — most notably, professors — and that the quality of
their public work has declined. A media that performs “virtually no gate-
keeping function” is partially responsible for an environment with “nobody
watching, nobody keeping score.”  
Posner attributes the decline in the quality of public intellectual work to
the “growth in the specialization of knowledge.” He states that “the fact
that most public intellectuals today are academics, and thus engaged in pub-
lic-intellectual work on only a part-time basis, enables them to exit the pub-
lic-intellectual market at a low cost and by doing so has reduced to a trivial
level the penalty for the public intellectual caught selling a defective prod-
uct.” 
The problem of assessing quality is not restricted to the press. Even acade-









consulting.review has been shown to be an unreliable indicator of a paper’s quality,
accuracy, or integrity. A study that examined several articles from a promi-
nent economics journal found that the papers almost always contained
errors that were not caught by the peer refereeing process. The errors were
sufficiently serious that the results could not easily be replicated. The
authors also found that, notwithstanding both the general norm that data be
available and the requirement of the National Science Foundation (nsf) that
data be produced on nsf-funded projects, their requests for data were
ignored, denied, or otherwise frustrated in a substantial number of cases.2
Moreover, peer review is undermined by the difficulty of actually procuring
the relevant data that are supposedly available. 
Finally, peer review cannot necessarily prevent or reveal dishonesty in aca-
demic work. A prominent sociology professor at the University of Texas
recently resigned after acknowledging scientific misconduct. She had been
accused of falsifying data that supported her research. A historian at Emory
University was accused of supporting an acclaimed book with untrue statis-
tics on gun ownership. And historian and author Stephen E. Ambrose has
been the subject of well-publicized plagiarism accusations. 
The benefits of disclosure — and the costs
T
he benefit of more disclosure is that the media public is given
additional information about possible conflicts of interest. When
disclosure raises a red flag that makes an editor or journalist exam-
ine arguments more closely, this is a benefit. Additionally, disclosure is also
valuable for its potential to deter what Richard Posner calls “improper and
irresponsible moonlighting.” More disclosure, unfortunately, has costs as
well. These include difficulties in monitoring and enforcement, difficulties in
defining an appropriate level of disclosure, and the impact on who provides
information and how they respond to disclosure rules.
Monitoring and enforcement. Some time ago, I was on a radio show
offering my views on the Microsoft case, a firm for which I occasionally
consult. The talk show host correctly identified me as a consultant and acad-
emic, but failed to note that one of the other “experts” on the show had
done a great deal of consulting for another firm on some key policy issues
related to the case. In doing so, she left the audience with the mistaken
impression that my counterpart in the debate was in some sense “clean”
because he had not consulted. 
This is an example of providing incomplete information to the public that
tilts the playing field toward the side that is viewed as clean. I think it is a
The False Promise of “Full Disclosure”
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very serious problem. The problem arises in part because the disclosure rules
are difficult to monitor and in part because they are not always enforced
with the same vigor. Moreover, the penalties for not disclosing are not that
high in most situations. 
Take another example. I am aware of many people who write opinion
pieces on a particular subject for direct compensation. Some disclose that
information while many others do not. No one seems to care, except editors
at major newspapers. They are less likely to publish op-eds that come with
some kind of disclosure statement because they do not want to be viewed as
supporting free advertisements for a particular point of view. This creates an
incentive not to disclose. The incentive is just one factor that determines
whether a piece will contain a disclosure statement.
In a study of biomedical articles, 34 percent of the
articles had an author with a financial interest relat-
ed to the topic of the article. None of those authors
disclosed a conflict of interest. The study’s author
explained that even when the publishing journals
have disclosure policies, poor compliance with those
policies is prevalent.3
Difficulties in defining an appropriate level of dis-
closure. The basic problem is that we are all walking
conflicts of interest because most of us have to work
for a living. And in exchange for money, most of us
make compromises. For academics and other profes-
sionals, it is not unusual to work for several compa-
nies, either giving speeches or on other short-term
contracts. Over time, it can be easy to develop con-
nections with businesses in the routine process of making a living. Not all of
these connections pose a conflict of interest. When considering what to dis-
close, it is sensible to focus on activities that could pose a substantial con-
flict. 
Richard Posner suggests a norm in which “academic public intellectuals
disclose their income from all their public intellectual work.” Posner quali-
fies his position with the caveat that compared to public officials’ disclosure
of their income, it is not as important that academics comply with strict dis-
closure standards because they are not as powerful. But he argues that “rev-
elation of the lucrative character of some of this moonlighting would help
the public to evaluate public intellectual work and would deter some of the
most questionable forms of it.” 
While some disclosure is justified, it is difficult to know where to draw










3See Steven Phillips, “A Conflict that Might Interest the Ethicists,” Times Higher
Education Supplement (April 27, 2001).bility in the media? Should I note on the bottom of my op-eds that a small
part of my compensation at aei and Brookings is related to the number of
op-eds I publish in newspapers? This, indeed, has an effect on the number of
op-eds I write, if not their bias. 
In some cases, the linkage between salary and taking a particular position
in the media is more direct. I know several people at so-called public interest
groups who get paid to take particular positions in the media. I do not
doubt that they believe these positions, but why, in principle, should they be
treated any differently from a business consultant taking money in exchange
for writing an op-ed? Yet they are treated very differently by the media —
with the opinion of the business consultant being
given less credence.
Again, let me return to the Microsoft example to
illustrate a problem with the incompleteness in the
definition of disclosure. I wrote an article for
Regulation on the Microsoft case before I became a
consultant for Microsoft. Just prior to the publica-
tion of the article, I was asked by someone repre-
senting an opponent of Microsoft if the article could
be withdrawn, and if I would consider a consultancy
with that firm. I said no and, frankly, was offended
by the offer. 
I use this example because it says lots about the
limitations of actual disclosure policies. You are not
asked to disclose clients that you turn away on prin-
cipled grounds — only those for whom you do
work. We might learn more about an individual
from how she discriminates among potential clients if we could observe that,
but, unfortunately, that’s difficult to do.
If disclosure policies do not provide much information on whether an
opinion is likely to be biased, we could examine an individual’s incentive to
preserve her reputation. Academics have some incentive to preserve their
professional reputation among their colleagues. This can help to put con-
straints on their public pronouncements, but may not solve the problem.
Those academics who care less about their reputation and are more interest-
ed in public exposure will be more likely to become pundits or talking
heads. This could decrease the overall quality of punditry, assuming that
were possible. 
Let me offer another example from the Joint Center website that will
illustrate some of the problems with “cleanliness” as perceived by the media.
I have signed one statement on liberalizing spectrum auctions at the Federal
Communications Commission and helped write a Supreme Court brief
signed by 39 leading economists on the need to consider costs, benefits, and
other relevant factors in regulatory decision making. While I did not take
any money for either endeavor, I fully expect that being on both documents
The False Promise of “Full Disclosure”










will enhance my market prospects and market value, both as an academician
and as a consultant. So, it would be a bit disingenuous for me to say that I
did not have a direct financial interest in these activities. Frankly, though,
that was not the primary reason I got involved. The main reason I got
involved is because I care deeply about how public policies affect real people
outside the beltway. Should I be required to disclose that? 
So, here we have an example of activities that would be viewed as clean
(and therefore, no disclosure is currently required), which give me substan-
tial monetary and nonmonetary benefits. Should we care more about my
future benefits likely to be derived from an activity than past payments? I
think so, but unfortunately, these benefits are hard to observe.
The difficulty of observing many features of dis-
closure taken together with gaining agreement on a
reasonable definition of full disclosure makes it a
difficult goal at best. But I fear that achieving the
goal would actually do more harm than good by
reducing the pool of experts and encouraging people
to circumvent the system in ways that do not aid in
the search for “truth.” 
Impact on who responds and how they respond.
Andrew Sullivan has suggested that an individual
who consults for a company should not write about
issues related to that company. He believes that indi-
vidual’s journalistic independence has been compro-
mised — no matter how innocent or transparent the
consulting arrangement. “Let’s say [Krugman and
Peggy Noonan] just took $50,000 minimum from
this company for legit extracurricular work,” he wrote. “Haven’t these pun-
dits essentially undermined themselves as independent watchdogs of the cul-
ture?”
Sullivan’s position, while extreme, has some empirical support. When an
individual consults for a company, she is more likely to take on the perspec-
tive of that company as a result of continued interactions with a group of
like-minded individuals. Even if a consultant tries diligently to preserve her
impartiality, there is a likelihood that a company’s views will grow on her,
and seem more sensible than they did before the consulting arrangement.
Sullivan’s rather extreme policy could reduce such conflicts, but at the
expense of reducing the available pool of experts. Who, after all, is in a bet-
ter position to write about a company, or a policy related to that company,
than someone who knows the business firsthand? Thus, there is a tradeoff
between available expertise and the degree of disclosure required.
Even stopping short of Sullivan’s suggestion to disallow any writing by a
consultant, calls for greater disclosure could be counterproductive. The pool
of potential experts on the subject may be reduced because some individuals









required.Moreover, some may simply evade the requirements and hope they don’t get
caught. Still others — the entrepreneurial types — will create “fronts” that
make the probability of detection less likely. A front is anything that
obscures the connection between an individual and that person’s sources of
support. It could be a business, a non-governmental organization, or an indi-
vidual serving as an intermediary.
What kind of fronts might be created? A look around at how the various
think tanks operate can offer some food for thought. Even the top think
tanks, like aei and Brookings, get much of their money from — dare I say
it? — business, or foundations whose wealth typically comes from business.
The foundations supporting think tanks run the gamut from anti-business to
pro-business, but a typical foundation will only pro-
vide support if it has a reasonable expectation of the
kind of results that will be produced. And even if
think tanks get their money from government —
read: the taxpayer — that will create conflicts
because of an interest in pleasing that funder.
The way think tanks deal with potential conflicts
is to introduce mechanisms that help preserve their
reputation for doing quality work. These mecha-
nisms include: hiring scholars who are interested in
preserving their academic reputations, peer-review-
ing their major published works, such as books, and
encouraging their scholars to publish in peer-
reviewed journals. 
Another important mechanism that think tanks
and universities use to preserve their reputation is to
obtain funding from a variety of sources. Such diversification makes it easier
for these institutions to have their scholars take positions that may be at
odds with the views of their funders. Free trade is a good example. aei
scholars are generally very supportive of free trade, even though some of
aei’s funders have argued for protectionist policies related to their firm or
industry.
The mechanisms for preserving reputation are not perfect, however.
Scholars may still be subjected to pressures from particular firms on particu-
lar issues. Those places concerned about their academic reputations tend to
be more adept at giving their scholars freer rein. But the bottom line is that
most money, even so-called government money, comes with some strings
related to expected results. 
And the competition for funds is fierce, which means there may be greater
emphasis on producing work that increases funding rather than first-rate
scholarship. Still, at the leading think thanks and universities, I think these
mechanisms work reasonably well for scholarship published in a scholar’s
area of expertise. Work published outside of a scholar’s area of expertise is
another matter.
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Unfortunately, not all think tanks or universities take the same degree of
pride in academic freedom as aei or Brookings. Posner, for example, pro-
vides an account of the Independent Institute’s support of Microsoft while it
was receiving funding from the firm. But if disclosure requirements were
enforced more rigorously, I would expect more think tanks to emerge that
serve as fronts for all sorts of preferred interest group policies. 
The same is true of websites. While I can say that the aei-Brookings Joint
Center website has not been influenced one iota by our funders, I know
other websites where that is not the case, and I’m sure you do too.
Moreover, revealing the sources of support typically provides little, if any,
useful information about whether the work produced or featured by a site
represents independent analysis, or is merely a convenient vehicle for adver-
tising a funder’s preferred policy position. This creates a real problem for
people wishing to use disclosure as a meaningful measure of potential con-
flicts of interest.
In some cases, disclosure is selective. Posner notes that after the Valdez oil
spill, Exxon paid several academics to write articles on punitive damages. In
the articles, the authors noted that Exxon had paid them for their work. But
when Exxon used the articles as cited sources in briefs it prepared for its
appeal proceedings, it failed to disclose that it had paid for the articles.
Moreover, neither Exxon nor the commissioned academics would disclose
the amount of the received payment. 
The point is that calls for greater disclosure will lead to more innovative
ways to circumvent disclosure and we should keep that in mind in crafting
solutions.
What needs to be done?
C
onsider disclosure. A requirement of full disclosure is not
meaningful because it is hard to know how to implement and is
likely to create perverse incentives. The current system of disclosure,
for all its warts, is not a bad starting point. That system generally requires a
scholar to identify conflicts that would not pass a political “smell test.” That
is, if there is a reason to think that an average reader would be suspicious if
a scholar did not disclose something, then she should disclose it. 
The basic problem with the current system of disclosure is that it is
incomplete. The media need to recognize this and do a better job. Here are
five concrete suggestions.
Suggestion 1: Place less reliance on disclosure as a signal. Disclosure can
provide a useful hint about a conflict of interest, but several other factors
should be taken into account. For example, does the “expert” have a reputa-
tion to preserve (e.g., in her field of expertise)? How do reputable colleagues
view her?
Suggestion 2: Apply rules for evaluating experts across the board. That
Robert W. Hahnmeans doing due diligence on all participants in a debate, not just those
where the conflicts are most obvious. The notion that taking money from
industry should necessarily taint someone is naïve. But if it is going to be
treated as a practice that warrants disclosure, the self-interest of individuals
who appear to be clean, such as those from so-called public interest groups
and government, should also be highlighted. 
Suggestion 3: Find out whether the person is really an expert. I’m an
economist — Ph.D. and all. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve heard “talk-
ing heads” get up there on tv and radio talk shows and get treated with
great respect on the stock market and forecasting issues, when they actually
know next to nothing on the subject. The press should not give these people
a pass, just because they sound good. 
Suggestion 4: The media should think harder. The
press needs to be more critical in an academic sense.
There is no substitute for actually reading some
reports to determine their quality. If this skill is in
short supply, as I think it is for many journalists,
then leading media outlets, such as the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, and cnn, should hire
people to support reporters who can think critically
about technical issues. Some of these skills can be
taught and they should be.
Suggestion 5: We all should think harder. One of
the things I try to teach in the classroom is critical
thinking. Does the argument the person is making
really hold water? If more people learn to think criti-
cally, this would help.
What’s wrong with these recommendations? The
media seem to be happy with the status quo, and for the most part, so is the
public. So there is nothing that is likely to move us in this direction quickly
unless some foundation, or foundations, with serious money decides to take
up the cause.4 One might consider government help, but beyond a voucher
program to stimulate competition and improve quality in education, I do
not see a useful government role.
Posner has suggested that, in addition to disclosing income related to pub-
lic intellectual work, academics should provide all of their work on public
intellectual activities in some kind of form that is easily retrieved, such as
posting to a website. He suggests that “one solution might be for universities
to require their faculty members to post annually, on the university’s web
page, all the non-academic writing . . . and public speaking that they have
The False Promise of “Full Disclosure”
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done during the preceding year. . . . At the end of the year the contents of the
web page would be downloaded and printed out, and copies deposited in
the major university libraries.” 
Posner’s ideas could, of course, be extended to pundits in general. The
question is what good they would do. I’m not so sure. I am certain that it
would decrease the supply of opinion makers on key public policy issues,




e began with a tale of Paul Krugman and a controversy
over disclosure, but I don’t think Krugman is the real story
here. I think the real story is that disclosure has serious limita-
tions, there are lots of major conflicts of interest out there that don’t get
reported, and that the press tends to tilt the playing field in ways that have
not been adequately considered.
Full disclosure, far from being a panacea, could make things worse. My
basic suggestions for fixing the problem are a press that thinks more critical-
ly and a public that does the same. Don’t hold your breath.
Robert W. Hahn